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The Limits of Europeanization: 
Regulatory Reforms in the Spanish and Portuguese Telecommunications and  
Electricity Sectors 
 
Does Europeanization lead to changes in the governance of the European 
economies or is it only a reflection of these changes? In particular, is market 
liberalization a product of Europeanization? While research on the European 
Union is thriving, only limited systematic and empirical attempts have been made 
to distinguish its effects from those of wider and global liberalization processes. In 
order to deal with this question, we compare the progress of regulatory reform in 
two network industries – telecommunications and electricity – in Spain and 
Portugal and examine the role of Europeanization in this process. The study is 
multi- level in the sense that it examines national and sectoral changes in the 
context of the creation of European-level telecoms and electricity regimes. These 
European regimes represent two of the most significant successes of the European 
policy process. In both cases, a coalition of political actors led by the European 
Commission was highly successful in promoting Europe-wide liberal regimes for 
telecoms (a key sector in the creation of the ‘information economy’) and 
electricity (one of the sectors that until the mid-1990s were thought of as immune 
to change).  
 
Building on an emerging tradition of cross-sectoral research of these two sectors 
(Schmidt, 1997 1998; Levi-Faur, 1999, 2003, 2004a; Bartle, 1999, 2002, 2003; 
Coen, 2001; Padgett, 2001, Curien and Matheu, 2001; Murillo, 2002), we ask to 
what extent the establishment of new European regulatory frameworks in these 
sectors is the driving force behind the liberalization in the two countries and 
sectors. We then further ask to what extent the emergence of new EU-level 
regimes for these two industries constrains neo-mercantilist behaviour in the two 
countries. Do these new European regimes serve as the major framework for 
governance and economic behaviour?  Or are they so minimal in scope and so 
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loosely formulated that they leave major issues to the discretion of member states 
and national policy communities? In order to answer these questions, this paper 
compares similarities and variations in regulatory reforms in the telecoms and 
electricity sectors in Spain and Portugal and examines the impact of 
Europeanization on (a) similarities across both sectors and nations; (b) similarities 
across sectors and variations across nations; (c) variations across sectors and 
similarities across nations; and (d) variations across both sectors and nations. We 
observe how the different cases evolved before and after the creation of the EU 
regimes, looking at both the Europeanization of markets (that is, creation of single 
European market) and the Europeanization of governance (that is, the creation of a 
distinctive European model of public control over private action). In doing so, the 
paper examines also the limits of the single market and the process of 
Europeanization.  
 
Europeanization has many faces. Olsen (2003) mentions five: (1) changes in 
external territorial boundaries; (2) the development of institutions of governance at 
the European level; (3) the penetration of national and sub-national systems of 
governance by the centre; (4) the export of forms of political organization and 
governance that are typical of and distinct for Europe; and (5) a political project 
aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe. Our definition is admittedly 
demanding, yet it supplies clear empirical criteria for our analysis. We define 
Europeanization as the institutionalization of a common political and economic 
order at the trans-national level mainly through membership in the European 
Union and particularly the creation of issue- and sector-specific regimes at the EU 
level.  
 
As said, we examine the impacts of Europeanization on both nations and sectors. 
First, we look at the Europeanization of governance as it is reflected at the level of 
the institutions of the state in Spain and Portugal and specifically in the role of the 
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regulatory authorities, their autonomy and their relations with the ministries. 
Second, we analyse the Europeanization of markets as it is reflected in the 
processes of privatization and the creation of competitive and open environments 
within and across national borders. We suggest that, if ‘Europeanization matters’, 
then the creation of EU regimes will lead to: (a) the faster and smoother advance 
of liberalization than otherwise; (b) similar patterns of market integration and 
similar institutions of governance across the two countries; (c) varying degrees of 
liberalization depending on the extent to which the specific European regime 
promotes liberalization. Specifically, we may expect the lesser degree of 
delegation to the EU in electricity (intergovernmental regime) to be reflected in a 
lesser degree of market liberalization in electricity than in telecoms where 
delegation to the EU regime was more extensive (supranational regime); (d) a 
lesser degree of neo-mercantilism (promoting national champions and interests) 
with the advance of Europeanization; and (e) new strategies of internationalization 
of market operators, corresponding to the opportunities and constraints 
accompanying the progress of Europeanization. The methodology and research 
design that we adopt in examining the process of change in light of the above 
criteria is discussed in the next section of the paper.  
 
I. Case Selection and Research Design  
 
Case selection is of particular importance in small-N analysis.  We first clarify the 
space of variations in our cases and in particular the process of ‘casing‘ as a tool in 
our step-wise design. Casing is a process of setting the boundaries of the cases, 
which in this paper we do in three dimensions. The first type of case includes two 
regulatory regimes at the European level; section II compares the 1993 European 
regime for telecoms with the 1996 European regime for electricity (see Table 1). 
Our second type of case includes eight sectoral regimes bounded by time. The first 
four are telecoms cases (section III) and the remainder electricity (section IV). 
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They are defined by time and by country; thus, we have the telecoms sector in 
Portugal up to 1993 or the electricity sector in Spain after 1996. Third, we have 
the four compound cases of telecoms and electricity and of Spain and Portugal 
(section V). Here we look, not at the telecoms sector in Portugal in particular, but 
at the telecoms sector across all countries and at Portuguese patterns of 
liberalization in general, that is, beyond telecoms and electricity. These 
comparative strategies make the inferential process more formal and transparent 
on the one hand and more systematic on the other. Thus, we articulate what 
comparativists usually leave implicit (Levi-Faur, 2004b). At the same time, these 
strategies test research questions against a myriad of cases and thus potentially 
increase their consilience. 
 
Table 1: The Stepwise Comparative Design* 
Comparative Approach Step Section  Comparison 
 Nations Time Sectors 
1 II Telecoms and 
electricity regimes in 
the EU 
International Regime 
Approach (IRA) & Policy 
Sector Approach (PSA) 
 
Constant Constant Vary 
2 
 
III 
 
Telecom 
liberalization in 
Spain and Portugal 
up to 1993 
 
 
National Pattern Approach 
(NPA) 
 
Vary 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
3 III 
 
Telecom 
liberalization in 
Spain and Portugal 
after 1993 
National Pattern Approach 
(NPA) 
 
Vary Constant Constant 
4 IV Electricity 
liberalization in 
Spain and Portugal 
up to 1993 
 
National Pattern Approach 
(NPA) 
 
Vary Constant Constant 
5 IV Electricity 
liberalization in 
Spain and Portugal 
after 1993 
National Pattern Approach 
(NPA) 
 
 
 
Vary Constant 
 
Constant 
6 V Telecoms and 
electricity  
 Spain and Portugal 
Compound: PSA & NPA 
combined 
 
Vary Constant Vary 
* For the comparative terminology, see the introduction of this special issue as well as Levi-Faur 
(2004b).  
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We begin with a presentation of our two pairs of ‘compound cases’. Spain and 
Portugal share certain common characteristics that set them somewhat apart from 
other members of the European Union. From a historical perspective, we can cite 
their similar authoritarian legacies, Catholicism, late industrialization, strong 
religious institutions, late democratization, traditions of centralism, as well as, 
more recently, wide public support for Europeanization (Sapelli, 1995; Malefakis, 
1995; Giner, 1986; Medrano-Diez, 2003). None of these similarities makes the 
two countries identical, and we suggest that the notions of ‘liberal étatism‘ and 
‘social étatism‘ capture reasonably well the specific mixture of variations and 
similarities in Spain and Portugal. Étatism is often contrasted with liberal and 
corporatist patterns of state-business relations or ‘styles’:  
 
Liberal-pluralist styles comprise a preference for market solutions to 
policy problems and use market-like structured associational systems 
(open network boundaries, many network members, flexibility, general 
accessibility of state agencies, lobbyism and limited involvement of 
interest associations in public policy). Étatism implies a preference for 
‘state’ solutions to policy problems, i.e. a dominant role of the state in 
policymaking and in network structures and by implication a role for 
interest associations limited to lobbying. Corporatism represents a 
preference for ‘associational’ solutions to policy problems, that is, self-
regulation by civil society and/or delegation of public policy to interest 
associations, and framework regulation facilitating this. The network 
structures are characterized by relatively small size, closed boundaries, 
privileged access, representational monopolies and stability over time . 
(Waarden, 1999, 104)  
 
These ideal types of policy style are often exemplified in paradigmatic cases. 
Thus, France is usually the paradigmatic case for étatism, Britain (and the US) for 
liberal-pluralism and the Scandinavian countries for corporatism. Note that these 
are theoretical constructions to which, obviously, individual nations constitute 
better or worse fits. Why étatism for Spain and Portugal? At the most obvious 
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level, étatism is a default option that captures the characteristics of these polities 
much better than the notions of liberal-pluralism and corporatism. Liberal-
pluralism is usually identified with the Anglo-Saxon countries, and its major 
characteristics are largely foreign to Spain and Portugal (although less so the 
former than the latter). As for corporatism, Spain and Portugal are both low on 
trade union membership, have highly concentrated public administration and 
industrial sectors, and have relatively weak employer associations. As well, 
étatism seems to capture some important characteristics, such as a history of late 
industrialization in both countries that is associated generally with a much more 
active role for government than in liberal economies and societies (Gerschenkron, 
1962). Another important aspect in both countries is the historical centralization of 
power in their domestic business community and society as well as in their 
colonial administration.  Spain, however, moved faster with industrialization and 
was less centralized than Portugal, and always had strong domestic civil 
opposition to the centre (thus, Portugal did not experience a civil war). More 
recently, in Portugal it was the armed forces that led the insurrection that resulted 
in democratization (April 1974). In Spain, it was the death of General Franco that 
triggered the transition, which was led by regime reformists and the monarchy  
(Linz and Stepan, 1996; Maxwell, 1995). Another notable difference in the degree 
of étatism is the significant territorial decentralization that has occurred in Spain in 
the democratic era but not in Portugal.  
 
A second adjective is necessary in order to refine the commonalities of étatism in 
the two countries. Liberal étatism seems to us to capture the essence of 
government-business relations in Spain, while social étatism seems to fit the 
Portuguese case. Liberal étatism signifies the existence of a stronger business 
community in Spain than in Portugal. This is best reflected in the structure of the 
financial system, notably the existence of private banks (BBVA and BSCH) that 
exercise control over a wide array of private (and privatized) business in Spain in 
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contrast to the dominance of a public bank in Portugal (CGD). Social étatism best 
captures the Portuguese system since it better reflects the strong social orientation 
of the Portuguese revolution and constitution (Fishman, 2003). It might also be 
reflected in the fact that, while for most of the post-war period the Spanish 
expenditures on social protection were larger than the Portuguese, by the end of 
the 1990s Portugal was spending more on this item as a percentage of GDP despite 
being poorer than Spain (Guillen et al., 2002: 234-7). While the health systems of 
both countries cover the whole population, Spanish labour policies, unlike those of 
Portugal, seem to endorse or at least to tolerate high unemployment. Indeed, 
unemployment in Spain was almost three times higher for most the period 1980-
2000 than in Portugal (e.g., in 2000 it was 4.1 percent in Portugal and 14.1 percent 
in Spain). Given their statist traditions and relatively peripheral status in the EU,  
the two countries are the least likely cases for liberalization. The liberal and supra-
nationalist agenda of Europeanization is , therefore, examined here in light of the 
least favourable cases (Portugal was even less favourable to the liberalization 
agenda than Spain). 
 
The other pair of our compound cases comprises telecoms and electricity, which 
were closely intertwined with the nation-state. Yet since the mid-1980s these two 
network industries have experienced radical degrees of liberalization. Indeed, the 
extent of change exceeds that of other infrastructures in the modern economy (e.g., 
gas, oil, railways, roads, airlines, and media). Both sectors are constructed around 
extensive and very expensive grids. More so than any other element of these 
sectors, it is the grids that display their natural monopoly characteristics. The grids 
are strategic assets that in the absence of regulatory constraints allow their owners 
to control other segments of the sector and, more important, the access of other 
suppliers to customers. Yet the constraints on the grids are such as to make 
electricity less prone to competition than telecoms, for four technological and 
economic reasons. 
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First, alternatives to the copper wires of telephony are available to an extent that 
does not exist in electricity. Mobile telephony, and then wireless and cable 
telephony, have provided alternative networks to the wire-telephony grids. 
Second, technology offers new options for using electricity grids for the 
transmission of telecom data (packet-switching) and new options for electricity 
(and railway) companies to use their internal communication systems (and right-
of-way) to supply telecom services. While it is possible to use the electricity grids 
and assets to transfer telecom, the reverse is impossible. There is a one-way 
convergence between these technologies, implying that telecoms will face 
competition from electricity but not vice-versa. Third, electricity transportation is 
sensitive to distance in a way that is unknown in modern telecoms. While at the 
moment it is feasible to produce electricity in Germany and consume it in 
Portugal, this option is costly. The transmission losses and the considerable costs 
involved in the construction of electricity interconnections weaken competitive 
pressures from distant generators; after the digital revolution, telecom 
interconnections are much simpler and easier to monitor. Fourth, the transportation 
of electricity requires grids that cost about ten times more than the transportation 
of telecom, which further limits the options for plurality of networks that are so 
essential for competition.  Thus, we have good reason to expect competition in 
electricity to be more limited than in telecoms, and the ‘goodness of fit ’ between 
the ideas of liberalization and the realities of the sector to be greater in telecoms 
than in electricity.  
 
 
II. Varieties of EU-level regimes  
 
Efforts to promote European-level policies in the telecoms and electricity sectors 
were evident before the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and even before the 
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rise of neo-liberalism to a hegemonic position (Kalyvas, 1994). Yet these early 
efforts were basically connected to industrial policies and the safety of energy 
supply. Signs of policy change in telecoms in the early 1980s  included the 
divestiture of AT&T in the US and the privatization of Cable and Wireless and 
British Telecoms in the UK and of NTT in Japan. At the EU level, notable was the 
publication of ’Action Lines’ (1983), which later served as the basis for the 
Community’s telecoms plan (Schneider et al., 1994).  In 1986 a directorate for 
telecoms was established in the European Commission and serve to promote a 
European regime in the sector.1  The publication of the Green Paper on the 
liberalization of telecoms equipment and services in 1987 provided additional 
impetus and set the agenda for future discussion and legislative initiatives. Four 
more Green Papers were published between 1990 and 1996, and between 1984 
and 1999 the Council and the Commission enacted about 170 pieces of telecoms 
legislation (Natalicchi, 2001, 190). Up until 1992, liberalization efforts were 
directed towards terminal equipment, services and satellites. A more radical step 
was taken in June 1993 with a Council resolution to open voice telephony, the 
major segment of the market, to competition as of 1 January 1998 for all EU 
countries (but with moratoria for specific cases).  Liberalization efforts that were 
first confined to minor segments of the market were now focused on the major 
ones.  
 
In electricity, like the energy sector at large, both liberalization and 
Europeanization proceeded extremely slowly. True, the directorate of energy 
(DGXVII) was institutionalized as far back as 1968, long before the directorate for 
telecoms. But energy was generally considered a ‘national concern’ (Andersen, 
1993, 134). A modest move was the adoption of a directive in 1990 concerning the 
transparency of electricity and gas prices for industrial consumers. The 
Commission hoped thereby to increase the bargaining power of industrial users 
vis-à-vis suppliers. In the same year a Transit Directive was adopted to promote 
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open access for a third country member states that did not share a common border 
Midttun, 1996, 266-270). A significant attempt to promote reform came only in 
1992, when the Commission published the draft of a directive intended to abolish 
exclusive rights, thus promoting (a) building new electricity grids; (b) building 
new generation facilities; and (c) open access to distribution and transmission 
grids. In addition, the draft required the unbundling of the generation, 
transmission, and distribution functions of integrated monopolies as a safeguard to 
competition in this sector. 
 
This proposal was fiercely opposed by the industry and the member states 
(Padgett, 1992, 69-70). There was good reason to believe that Article 90 of the 
Treaty of Rome, which provides the Commission with competencies to prohibit 
state monopolies from engaging in anti-competitive practices, could be applied to 
electricity. However, the Commission opted for a cooperative procedure to 
facilitate consensual decision making (Schmidt, 1998). It took five years of 
negotiations and extensive efforts at compromise before a Franco-German deal 
paved the way in 1996 for the creation of a European regime (a similar deal made 
possible progress in telecommunications). By the end of 1996 an Electricity 
Directive (96/92/CE) had been adopted. The directive called for open access to the 
transmission and distribution networks and set up eligibility criteria for 
implementation according to the level of consumption. A February 1999 deadline 
was set for the provision of choice of electricity supplier to large industrial users; 
the directive also aimed to extend choice of electricity supplier to households, 
albeit some time later.  A new directive (2003/54/CE) of 26 June 2003 amended 
some of the legal provisions of the 1996 regime. It contained further measures 
requiring legal unbundling of network activities from generation and supply, 
established a regulator in all member states with well-defined functions, imposed 
transparent network tariffs, and reinforced public service obligations.  It came into 
force in July 2003, and established deadlines for opening the electricity market to 
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all non-household consumers of 1 July 2004, and to all  consumers (households 
included) of July 2007. By establishing these deadlines, the new directive aims to 
harmonize open market provision across the EU member states. 
 
While the EU-level regime is a fact of life in both electricity and telecom sectors, 
the extent to which the member states transferred controlled upward to the EU 
level varies.  Since the extent of transfer for electricity has been much more 
restricted than for telecoms, Levi-Faur (1999) has  proposed a distinction between 
supranationalism in telecoms and intergovernmentalism in electricity. The lesser 
degree of transfer of control of electricity, and thus its intergovernmentalism, is 
evident in the wide discretion of member states that is recognized in four elements 
of the electricity directive of 1996. First, the directive allows member states to opt 
either for a Third Party Access (TPA) principle or for Single Buyer status. In the 
former case, consumers or suppliers negotiate terms of access with the operator of 
the grid, while in the latter case a single  national operator handles all requests for 
import and is directly responsible for the supply of electricity to consumers. 
Second, the directive opens the way for a member state to choose a system of 
negotiated or regulated access. Here, the question of tariffs takes centre stage. The 
generators and the consumers are critically dependent on the grid operator, which 
may abuse its power. Member states can leave tariffs and conditions of access to 
the electricity operators and distributors to negotiate (negotiated TPA) or they can 
regulate them (regulated TPA). Clearly, only the second case provides safeguards 
for competition, but the directive allows member states to avoid competition and 
Europeanization. Third, a reciprocity clause allows member states, for a period of 
up to nine years, to restrict import of electricity from countries that open their 
markets to a lesser extent. Finally, the issue of whether to allow distribution 
companies to shop around freely for the electricity they distribute is left to the  
discretion of the member states. This is a critical aspect of competition as the 
distribution companies are well-placed to exert pressure on generators and 
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transmission operators to lower their electricity prices.  The changes that were 
introduced by the new directive of 2003 do not substantially affect the differences 
between the EU telecoms and electricity regimes. 
 
III. Telecoms Liberalization in Spain and Portugal 
 
To what extent was the establishment of a new European telecoms regime the 
driving force beyond the liberalization of telecoms in the Spain and Portugal? And 
to what extent do the new EU-level regimes constrain mercantilist behaviour by 
governments and market actors? This section compares developments in the 
telecoms sectors in the two countries before and after 1993, the year in which the 
key decisions to create the European regime were taken.  
 
 
Telecom Liberalization in Spain and Portugal up to 1993 
Telecoms regimes in Spain and Portugal shared some important similarities even 
before the era of liberalization. Unlike almost all west European countries, Spain 
and Portugal did not fully nationalize their operators. In Spain, Franco’s regime 
purchased in 1946 a controlling share of the private monopoly owned by 
International Telephone and Telegraph (Little, 1979). Yet the company, 
Telefonica, continued to enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy (Jordana, 2002, 
87-90). In the Portuguese case, nationalization came only in the late 1960s. Private 
ownership in Portugal was accompanied by a fragmented industrial structure in 
which different operators covered different parts of the country (again an 
exceptional case in Europe, where the industry was consolidated almost 
everywhere as one operator for one country). Both states had only a marginal 
interest in the sector until the 1980s. Indeed, some efforts were made to create 
local technological capacities (especially in Spain after the 1960s), yet the state 
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did not take on a steering role in the sense of formulating goals and priorities, 
apart from odd measures of the industrial development type.  
 
The role of the state changed only in the context of democratization of both 
countries and an increasing awareness of the importance of telecoms in the 
information society.   In Portugal, it resulted in the est ablishment of the first 
telecom regulatory agency in Europe, Instituto das Comunicacoês de Portugal 
(ICP), in 1981. In Spain, the General Secretary of Communications and the 
General Directory of Telecommunications were created in 1985, with the aim of 
studying, controlling and coordinating the sector. What is evident in both countries 
– in the 1980s and even before they joined the EC/EU – is that that the state 
became increasingly interested in the sector and that that interest increased in the 
second half of the 1980s and well into the 1990s. 
 
In April 1986, four months after Portugal joined the EC, the government set up a 
special commission to study the sector. The commission’s report formed the basis 
of a Telecommunications Act of 1989, the first piece of legislation whose scope 
embraced the whole Portuguese telecom industry. It defined public 
responsibilities, guaranteed access to certain services and opened value-added 
services to competition. The functions of the ICP were extended and the agency 
was granted a certain amount of autonomy. In Spain, the government paid less 
attention to telecoms at that time but the trend was similar to that in Portugal, and 
in 1987 the Parliament approved the first telecommunications act in more than 
seventy years. This law provided a clear legal framework and a clear distinction 
between the state and the operator. At the same time it distinguished between 
monopolistic and competitive services, the latter to be authorized by the 
government case by case. 
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Signs of change were evident also in the increasing tendency to open some 
segments of the telecoms market to competition and to make the first moves 
towards privatization. New legislation liberalized the equipment market in both 
countries in 1989. Portugal went even further by opening value-added services to 
competition in the same year, a step which was followed in 1992 by Spain in the 
context of the implementation of the 1990 EU directive on value-added services. 
A major arena of change was the emerging market for mobile telephony. Portugal 
once again made the first move in this market.  The incumbent had been operating 
a land mobile phone system since the late 1980s, but a second licence was granted 
in 1991 to Telecel, a consortium comprising mainly Portuguese partners, with 
France Telecom providing the technology. Similarly, Spain awarded a mobile 
telephony licence to a new group (AIRTEL) in 1994. 
 
A first step towards privatization was taken in 1987, when the Spanish  
government allowed capital mobilization by Telefonica that reduced the state’s 
shareholding in the company from about 40 percent to about 32 percent. Yet it 
took eight more years for the first privatization of Spanish shares to occur. In 
Portugal the main changes were the restructuring of the sector and the 
consolidation of three operators with different organizational  identities and 
traditions into one company, Portugal Telecoms (PT) – a process that culminated 
in 1994–95. Thus, by 1995, a time of wholesale liberalization of telecoms markets, 
Portugal paradoxically centralized government control over the telecoms operators 
and achieved what other countries had had for decades: a single public operator 
running a monopoly (Sousa, 1996, 663). Partly for this reason, and despite the 
removal of constitutional constraints, no effort was made to privatize until the 
government ensured the creation and consolidation of a national champion.   
 
Some provisional conclusions about the first years of policy change can be safely 
made at this stage. First and foremost is the observation that the Spanish and the 
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Portuguese started to steer the sector only in the context of democratization and 
before the consolidation of the European regime. Second, these governments 
promoted liberalization without waiting for the creation of a European regime for 
telecoms, but partially anticipated it. True, the steps that were taken were only 
modest, as they focused on relatively minor markets. Neither country privatized, 
but the first signs of a new approach were evident in both.  It would, therefore, be 
misleading to see the process as one in which the European Commission is 
struggling against reluctant member states. Since the mid-1980s, the dynamics of 
market liberalization in this sector was evident even outside the context of 
Europeanization.   
 
 
Telecom Liberalization in Portugal and Spain after 1993 
The establishment of European regime for telecoms since 1993 (see section II) 
coincides with a similar move towards liberalization in the two countries. Looking 
at the Portuguese and Spanish sectors, we find important similarities and 
differences. At the level of the organization of government , we see the 
consolidation of the position of the regulatory authorities as the major locus of 
liberal government intervention in the two countries.  As was clarified above, a 
regulatory authority was established in Portugal as early as 1981, clearly beyond 
any influence of the EC/EU. Some changes that increased its autonomy were 
introduced at the end of the 1980s and once again in 2001, when more 
comprehensive changes resulted in the establishment of ANACOM. Spain moved 
more slowly in this respect. The first indications of the intention to establish a 
regulatory authority in Spain came in 1994 under the Socialists. Yet the actual step 
was taken in 1996 by a centre-right government, and the new regulatory authority, 
Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (CMT), has operated since 
1997.  If the regulatory agencies became a major locus of regulation-for-
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competition, the ministries kept enough power – as we will see later – to protect 
‘national interests’ mainly through the promotion of national champions. 
 
Unlike in the reform of the governance structure, Spain was ahead of Portugal in 
privatization. In 1995 the Spanish Socialist government sold 11 percent of 
Telefonica’s shares in the context of an effort to adjust the public finances to the 
criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Privatization was far from 
‘natural’ or ‘liberal’. A year later, the new Spanish government of the right-wing 
Popular Party nominated a chairman for Telefonica who had a close relationship 
with the party, and only then moved towards a public offering of the remaining 21  
percent of shares at the beginning of 1997. A ‘golden share’ allowed the 
government to veto changes in control for ten years, and it was used to block 
Telefonica’s proposed merger with the Dutch incumbent in 2000.  Both decisions 
point to the continuity of the Spanish government’s interest in the sector. This was 
also evident when a decision was taken to establish a second national operator to 
compete with Telefonica. The goal was to establish a transitional duopoly for two 
years to allow the new company to strengthen itself before the market was opened 
in November 1998. Retevision, a public firm operating in the radio and TV 
communications sector, was used a basis for the creation the new operator.2 The 
creation of second operator aimed to concentrate most of the competition among 
strong Spanish operators after liberalization. It also gave politicians an opportunity 
to make more decisions in this sector. 
 
In Portugal, privatization was begun by the government of the Social Democrats – 
a centre-right party – and was continued by the Socialist government elected in 
1995. The Socialist government signed a contract with Portugal Telecoms (PT) for 
thirty years in May 1995, granting the company use of the network (which 
remained publicly owned) in return for guaranteeing universal service. The quid 
pro quo was that PT would guarantee access to the network by other operators in 
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accordance with EC legislation on fair competition. Privatization also advanced 
very gradually and was completed only in 2000. After that, the Portuguese state 
retained golden shares which gave it the final say on certain strategic matters and 
some small level of indirect ownership. The Portuguese concentrated their 
energies on the consolidation and formation of PT as a national champion and 
avoided the creation of second operator. The processes in both countries reveal 
that privatization was not simply about government retreating from the economy. 
It was seen as an opportunity to take decisions and to shape the sector in ways that 
would have a long-term impact on the extent of competition and on the structure 
of ownership of the operators. The Spanish and Portuguese governments were 
hesitant in promoting competition at the beginning of the 1990s, and bargained 
with the European Commission in 1993 for delays in opening the market to 
competition. However, it was the good performance of the major operators at 
home and abroad that enabled both governments to move faster and along with the 
majority of the EU’s member states.  
 
In certain respects the single telecoms market is a success, as both countries, along 
with the other member states, implemented the bulk of the liberalization 
programme as laid down in the 1993 European regulatory framework. Yet, at 
another and perhaps more important level, this development reveals the limits of 
Europeanization.  Not only are the Portuguese and Spanish national telecom 
markets integrated to only a limited degree with Europe; they are not even 
integrated with one another, and regulatory policy is decided on a national basis 
(Henten and Schneider, 2003). There is no single Iberian telecoms market but two 
separate ones, each liberalized to a degree but not in a way that could not have 
been achieved without the European supranational regime.  This is highly visible 
at the level of the operators of fixed telephony, but it is also the case in the mobile-
telephony market, in which some firms are really global operators.  
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No less revealing of the limits of Europeanization are the strategies of 
internationalization of the Spanish and Portuguese operators. Rather than investing 
in each other’s markets, either in collaboration or through competition, they turned 
to their former colonies. Telefonica acquired controlling shares of the incumbents 
in Chile and Argentina in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1994 it acquired the 
Peruvian incumbent. In 2001, Telefonica controlled 56 percent of the fixed lines in 
Argentina, 34 percent in Brazil, 73 percent in Chile and about 100 percent in Peru. 
In addition, it has interests and activities in Venezuela, Mexico, Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Puerto Rico (Rozas, 2003). Portugal Telecoms  has major activities in 
Brazil, where since 1998 it has controlled significant mobile operators as well as a 
major Internet provider. It is also active in, and controls, fixed-line operators in the 
former Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Macau, Mozambique 
and Timor. While both companies have some investments in Europe, these are 
minor in comparison with the investments in their linguistic areas (and former 
colonies). Indeed, the extent of integration of the Spanish and the Colombian 
telecoms markets is quite similar to that of the Spanish and the Belgium markets. 
Despite the strong similarities between the trajectories of liberalization in the two 
countries, we have no reason to believe that these similarities are either dictated 
by the European regime or directed mainly by the project of creating a single 
European telecoms market. Liberalization and Europeanization are usually 
portrayed as constraints on national decision-making. However, what we found 
here is that they were used as opportunities for modernization and, where they 
were believed to involve constraints on the national interest, both liberal and 
European principles were modified.  
 
IV. Electricity Liberalization in Spain and Portugal 
Moving now from telecoms to electricity, we first examine the changes in the 
Spanish and Portuguese regimes for electricity up to 1996. We then move to a 
comparative analysis of the two countries’ electricity policies from 1996 onwards 
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under the new European regime (steps 4 and 5 in Table 1). Our analysis shows that 
both countries continued making significant attempts at liberalization even before 
1996. This is particularly true in respect of privatization, but we also identify clear 
efforts to promote competitive arrangements and to redesign the structure of 
governance at the national level in the two countries especially with regard to the 
generation sector. While efforts to promote competition were not successful, and 
liberalization was implemented only in the post-1996 era, our research once again 
throws doubt on the argument that Europeanization was the major driving force 
for change in the two countries.  
 
Electricity Liberalization in Spain and Portugal up to 1996 
While Spanish electricity supply had already been proclaimed a public service in 
1924, private suppliers dominated the governance regime and limited the role of 
the state. Thus, planning for electricity growth was in the hands of the association 
of electricity suppliers (UNESA) until the 1970s, and only thereafter was it 
transferred to the government. Indeed, the first comprehensive framework for 
electricity regulation in Spain was the 1994 law (LOSEN).  The major public 
institution was Endesa, which was established by the Franco regime in 1944. 
Endesa was expected to construct and operate thermo -generators using local coal 
and thus to contribute to the import-substitution strategy of the state. It operated as 
a minor actor in a market that was largely supplied by private companies that were 
backed by private financial oligarchies (Lancaster, 1989). Further growth in the 
role of the state came with the nuclear programme, which was largely aimed at the 
production of electricity by private operator s but still involved some important 
policy decisions and institutionalisation of energy functions at the government.  
Major change came in the mid-1980s when the Socialist government nationalized 
the high-voltage transmission network and expanded the role of the public 
company Endesa, though it avoided comprehensive nationalization in the British 
and French post-war style. Another change came about in 1994, when an 
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autonomous authority for electricity (Comision del Servicio Electrico Nacional, 
CSEN) was established (Boira-Segarra, 1997) , albeit with only advisory functions. 
 
Somewhat similar developments are evident in Portugal, although they occurred 
much more slowly than in Spain. The constitution of the Estado Novo (New State) 
of 1933 placed constraints on state enterprise and ensured the primacy of private 
enterprise. However, in the context of the post-war hydroelectric development, the 
state invested in the sector and some kind of ‘mixed enterprise’ prevailed. The 
administrative capacity, however, was very limited and the various ministries 
enjoyed only nominal capacity for control.  Unlike Franco, who backed the idea of 
state-led industrialization, Salazar was hostile to it and kept Portugal aloof from 
the international conventions of the period (Bermeo, 1990, 138). The transition to 
democracy radically changed the governance of the sector.  The 1976 constitution 
proclaimed the state enterprises as ‘the inalienable property of the Portuguese 
people’ (later, it would require a constitutional change to sell more than 50 percent 
of the state enterprise: Corkill, 1994, 217). Accordingly, the fragmented electricity 
sector was consolidated and nationalized in 1976 under a state-owned entity called 
Electricidade de Portugal (EdP) and subsequently private investment in the sector 
was legally barred (Cross, 1996, 183). For almost two decades, EdP was the major 
state agency in the electricity sector in Portugal. While formally it performed only 
service functions, its expertise and the institutional vacuum at the ministerial level 
made it the most important organization in the sector. Yet in 1995, as part of a 
reorganization of the sector, the Portuguese government decided to establish a 
regulatory authority for electricity, Regulatory Entity of the Electricity Sector 
(ERSE). While this regulatory authority started its operation only in 1997, it 
signified the coming transformation. 
 
In all that concerns liberalization in this period, Spain moved faster and at a more 
decisive and self-assured pace than did Portugal. Privatization was promoted in 
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1988 by Felipe Gonzalez’s ruling Socialist Party (PSOE) via a partial public 
offering of the public assets in Endesa in the stock exchanges of Madrid and New 
York. A second offering was made in 1994, and a final one in 1998 transferred all 
remaining shares. Portugal moved slowly, yet in the same direction. Constitutional 
restrictions were removed by the ruling centre-right Social Democrat Party (PSD). 
Two years later, in 1991, EdP was corporatized and became a public limited 
company, with public ownership but operating under private law. In 1996 the first 
decisive move towards privatization was made with the sale of 30 percent of EdP 
in the Lisbon stock exchange. This was followed by more offerings in 1997, 1998 
and 2000 that reduced the government stake to about 33 percent.  If privatization 
is one criterion of change in the electricity market, the other is government policy 
vis-à-vis independent power producers. Here it was Portugal that led the way, 
perhaps in the context of having more constraints on investment in electricity than 
Spain. While the first independent generators entered the Spanish market only at 
the end of the 1990s, Portugal had already made private investment in electricity 
legal in 1988. However, it was five more years before a private consortium in 
1992 won an international tender to supply electricity in Portugal. 
 
The move towards a more competitive environment was, however, very hesitant in 
both countries and focused mainly on competition in generation. In 1994, about 
two years before the creation of the EU regime for a single market in electricity, 
the Spanish government advanced competition in the generation segment of the 
industry while maintaining regulatory control over the transmission and 
distribution segments, and created an advisory regulatory agency (Curien and 
Matheu, 2001). Yet the law faced significant opposition from the established 
operators and was difficult to implement. With the rise of the centre-right 
government of the Popular Party, it was in effect suspended in 1996 (Lasheras, 
1999, 292).  The Portuguese government made a similar move towards 
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competition in generation in 1995, introducing legislation that recognized some 
generation activity as competitive and even before the consolidation of EU regime.  
 
All in all, some strong indications are evident in both countries in the period 
before the 1996 regime , especially with respect to private ownership and the 
development of autonomous regulatory capacities. Specifically, we observe some 
moves towards independent regulatory authority in Portugal and a regulatory 
advisory agency in Spain already in 1994. In addition, we observe the opening of 
the market for independent power producers (in the case of Portugal) and the 
privatization of the public operators in both countries. Moreover, in both countries 
in 1994 and 1995 came the first moves towards the creation of a competitive order 
in the generation of electricity. These moves, which eventually failed in the case 
of Spain and had only limited effect in the case of Portugal, indicate that the 
picture of inertia and member states reluctantly reacting to the pressures of the 
European Commission is partial at best. Since the single market programme does 
not enforce any preference for a particular form of ownership, the changes that are 
evident in the Spanish market since the late 1980s can hardly be seen as an 
expression of Europeanization. Nor can it be suggested that Portugal and Spain are 
exceptional here, as the majority of the privatizations that were undertaken among 
the EU member states before 2002 occurred before 1996 (Levi-Faur, 2004a). 
 
Electricity Liberalization in Spain and Portugal After 1996 
We move now to the period after the creation of the European electricity regime in 
1996.  As already mentioned, the establishment of autonomous regulatory 
institutions in Spain and Portugal predates the new EU regime. The Spanish 
authority Comisión del Sector Eléctrico Nacional (CSEN), established in 1994,  
was renamed in 1997 Comisión Nacional del Sector Eléctrico (CNSE). A third act 
in 1998 renamed it Comisión Nacional de la Energia (CNE) and extended its 
authority to other segments of the energy sector. Nominally, the Spanish agency 
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presents itself as an independent authority, yet this is hardly the case. Indeed, it is 
one of ’these kinds of agencies which provide advice to the ministry and are 
responsible for monitoring and arbitration, but have no definitive regulatory 
powers. In accordance with their advisory role, the areas of activity of these 
organizations are broadly defined to include most regulatory issues. Governance 
and decision-making structures and independent safeguards are similar to those 
adopted by independent regulatory agencies’ (Ocaña, 2003, 22).  
 
Unlike the Spanish politicians, who were thus reluctant to delegate control and 
were careful to preserve their authority by making only a limited commitment to 
autonomous regulation outside the scope of competition laws, the Portuguese 
seem to follow the blueprint of independent regulatory authorities (Ocaña, 
2003:20-22). The Portuguese Regulatory Entity of Electricity Sector (ERSE) has 
operated since 1997 under legislation dating from 1995. In 2002, ERSE 
competences were extended to the autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores, 
and to natural gas, and thus it became to become known as the Regulatory Entity 
of Energy Services. Another important step, taken in 2002, was the creation of the 
Competition Authority, which also exercises some authority over energy markets. 
Yet it is too early to assess its impact on the electricity market.  
 
 If in 1995 competition was understood to be possible and desirable in the 
generation segments of the Spanish and Portuguese electricity sectors, after 1996 
competition was applied to consumers, and choice of suppliers – for eligible 
consumers – was guaranteed at least at the legal level and, following the  
agreement, at the EU level.  After the suspension of the implementation of the pre-
1996 liberalization act, the new centre-right government in Spain concluded a 
Electricity Protocol that was signed with the industry in 1996 and led to a new 
electricity law designed to create a new electricity regime. The New Electricity 
Law came into force in January 1998 and introduced the liberalization of 
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generation and freedom of choice for eligible consumers. Then, in 1998, another 
agreement between the Ministry of Industry and Energy and the electricity sector, 
called the Miner Agreement, was signed in order to accelerate the liberalization 
process even beyond the EU minimum requirements for eligibility for choice of 
electricity supplier. Indeed, all consumers have been eligible for free choice of 
supplier as of 2003. 
 
The Portuguese also moved towards a more competitive market. While the law of 
1995 still provides the framework of electricity regulation, it was modified in 
order to adjust it to the EU directive in 1997. Most important, the regime for 
access to the transmission network was defined as regulated Third Party Access 
(regTPA) and the eligibility of consumers was set according to EU obligations. In 
2001, however, the Portuguese government took one further step and, like its 
Spanish counterpart, raised the qualified consumer’s thresholds beyond the EU 
requirements. Thus, while the EU obligation was to liberalize the market for 
consumers of more than 9GWh by 2003, the Portuguese government brought the 
deadline  forward to 2001. Yet, although Portugal went beyond the EU in this 
respect, it has been always behind Spain. The most striking difference here is the 
difference between the countries’ ability to switch electricity supplier. While this 
ability was estimated to extend to almost 32  percent of consumption in Spain, it 
accounted only for 4 percent of total Portuguese consumption (CNE and ERSE, 
2002, 8). While Spain has already liberalized its entire market, Portugal fixed mid-
2004 as its deadline for total liberalization. However, it is important to remember 
that it is mainly large business consumers that are affected. Households in Spain 
are practically still out of the game of switching suppliers, despite having had the 
right to do so since January 2003 (open competition at this level is very limited). 
 
Unlike in the sphere of competition, in Portugal the restructuring of EdP was only 
minimal, and the market is still dominated by the former public operator. The 
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market is thus horizontally concentrated and , to the extent that vertical 
restructuring was promoted as a policy, this was already achieved in 1994.  In that 
year, EdP was turned into a holding company and divided into six major 
independent subsidiaries, with one company for generation, one for transmission 
(REN), and four regional distribution companies. However, the restructuring did 
little to affect the dominance of the EdP, as all the subsidaries operate under the 
group’s headquarters authority. Some important developments in this sphere 
occurred in 1998, when accounting separation between generation and 
transmission was achieved. Administrative and legal separation between 
generation and transmission followed in 2000, when REN left the EdP Group and 
the state became the major shareholder in REN, owning 70 percent and leaving 
EdP only 30 percent. 
 
The variation in the move towards a more liberalized environment in the 
electricity industries of Portugal and  Spain have been accompanied by some   
similarites. First is the tendency towards the internationalization of national 
champions, in both cases mainly towards Latin America. Thus, the Spanish 
Endesa internationalized mainly to Latin America (Chile, Argentina, Colombia, 
Peru, Brazil and the Dominican Republic) but also undertakes significant activity 
in Portugal and Italy and, to a more limited extent , in a few other European 
countries. The Spanish Iberdola has a significant presence in Mexico, Guatemala 
and Bolivia, as well as in Brazil, but none in Europe.  In Portugal, EdP has a major 
presence in Brazil, Macau, Cape Verde and also Guatemala, but none in Europe.  
Thus, in neither country has liberalization made the operators Euro-centred. 
Second,  governments and companies are now actively promoting the creation of 
an Iberian market as a distinct unit with a common market operator and extended 
interconnection of the countries’ transmission networks. The process that started at 
the end of the 1990s faced some regulatory and technological difficulties, and 
consequently the creation of the Iberian market had to be postponed from the 
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original date of January 2003 to July 2004. This is a significant development at the 
national level and demonstrates a somewhat relaxed attitude on the part of the 
Portuguese towards ’Spanish imperialism’ but, as we will soon see, it reveals the 
ability of the four leading corporations (three Spanish and one Portuguese) to 
protect their position even in the context of a liberalized and Europeanized market. 
It also reveals the limits of the European regime and of the concept of a single 
European market for electricity. 
 
All in all, while the movement towards liberalization is consistent across the two 
periods, the creation of an EU regime for electricity in 1996 had an impact on the 
extension of the goals of competition for consumers by introducing eligibility for 
small consumers. Yet, while this goal is formalized at the level of laws and 
regulation, it is still far from a practical option for consumers, and since 2003 has 
been introduced very slowly, even in Spain.  At a different level, we observe that 
the changes both in the governance level (autonomous regulatory authorities) and 
in the market (private ownership, competition) are becoming more legitimate over 
time in both countries (that is, especially after 1996). Those actors who moved 
along only reluctantly did not see it as a major threat to their essential interests. 
This is true at the level of government officials as well as at the corporate level of 
managers and employees.  This observation, and especially the fact that the two 
countries proceeded with liberalization, first in advance of the creation of the 
European regime and later beyond its requirements, suggests that the European 
regime was not a major force behind liberalization.   
 
 
V. Similarities and Differences across Sectors and Nations 
 
We move on with our stepwise and iterative process of pair-wise comparisons to 
the aggregate level of liberalization and its relations to Europeanization. Instead of 
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comparing the Spanish and Portuguese electricity and telecoms sectors, we now 
compare the Spanish and Portuguese liberalization policies and their relations to 
Europeanization. Instead of looking at the Spanish telecoms sector, the Spanish 
electricity sector, the Portuguese telecoms sector , and the Portuguese electricity 
sector, in this section we compare the telecoms sector in the two countries with the 
electricity sector in the two countries. In other words, we are ‘casing’ our units of 
analysis in a ‘compound’, higher level of aggregation. At the same time we aim at 
a systematic and holistic review of variations and similarities across these sectors 
and nations and use Table 2 as a heuristic device.  
 
On the basis of our analysis, we expect European Union regimes to exert pressure 
for the creation of a single market in both sectors, but greater pressure for 
liberalization in telecoms than in electricity. We also expect Portugal and Spain to 
move reluctantly towards liberalization, though the degree of reluctance is 
expected to be higher in Portugal than in Spain.  Finally, we expect liberalization 
to move ahead more forcefully in telecoms than in electricity due to the 
technological and economic characteristics of the two sectors.  In the rest of this 
section we test these expectations against observations of four combinations of 
similarities and differences across the two countries and two sectors in order to 
draw some conclusions about the relations between Europeanization and 
liberalization.  We discuss expectations, observations and implications in respect 
of each of the  four combinations of differences and similarities. 
 
At the level of expectations, cross-national and cross-sectoral similarities in the 
advance of liberalization across Portugal and Spain and the two sectors suggest 
that variations in the EU regimes for telecoms and electricity and variations in the 
degree and type of étatism in Spain and Portugal were not critical determinants of 
the process of change. What we have observed, however, is that, despite a slow 
and hesitant start in electricity, liberalization has progressed well beyond initial 
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expectations. In both nations liberalization was promoted beyond the minimum 
obligations set by the EU, and the latest EU directive (2003/54/CE) seems to 
follow rather than to lead developments. This observation is of critical importance 
since, if it is the nature of the EU regime that shapes the extent of liberalization, 
we should have observed less electricity privatization, less delegation to national 
regulatory authorities and less regulation-for-competition. Yet what we have found 
is that apart from the technological and economic constraints that limit the extent 
of competition in electricity, this industry is increasingly and surprisingly subject 
to a liberal regime at the national level. This achieves a level that cannot be 
inferred from or explained by the nature of the EU’s intergovernmental regime and 
thus sheds sceptical light on the characterization of the process of Europeanization 
as the motor of liberalization in this case. We also observe strong similarities at 
the national level and, against our expectations for lesser degree of liberalization 
in Portugal, we have found that in general Portugal has moved in the same 
direction as Spain. Again, this might be seen as an effect of Europeanization; but 
our cross-temporal comparisons as presented in the two preceding sections of the 
paper do not support this interpretation. Cross-national and cross-sectoral 
similarities were found also in the selection of ‘national champions’ which are 
recognized to be ’capable of competing abroad, of opening new markets for other 
Spanish business, and supplying new technologies to the country’ (de Real 
Valdivielso, 2001, 171). These policies are major expressions of mercantilism and 
are complemented by the final set of similarities that we wish to emphasize. Both 
countries, in both sectors, supported the internationalization of their companies, 
which expanded their operations in the direction of Latin America rather than 
Europe. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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If we are to derive our expectations from the PSA, we should look out for cross-
sectoral variations in liberalization; these should certainly be greater than national-  
level variations. Specifically, we should expect a higher degree of liberalization in 
telecoms than in electricity due to the greater constraints on competition in 
electricity. Yet we have found only limited support for these expectations, as both 
sectors made considerable progress towards liberalization, with the technological 
and economic effects of higher barriers for competition affecting mainly 
household consumers.  The legal and regulatory framework enables competition, 
while technology and the economics of supply limit competition in household 
supply. Thus, the variations across sectors are grounded less in politics than in 
technology and economics.  Our expectations of cross-national variations 
(following the NPA) were based on the variations in state traditions, namely, the 
liberal étatism of Spain and the social étatism of Portugal: specifically, Portugal’s 
social étatism would result in a lesser propensity for liberalization. What we 
observe is significant processes of liberalization in both countries that cannot be 
explained fully by Europeanization, but for different policy strategies in each 
country. Indeed, as expected, the Portuguese moved more slowly in market-level 
changes but faster in governance reforms. To some extent, Spain did the contrary. 
Regulatory authorities in the two sectors are more autonomous in Portugal than in 
Spain, and Portuguese policy makers were capable of delegating to a greater 
extent that the Spanish authorities.  Yet at the market level reforms moved faster 
in Spain for both sectors. The variations in national liberalization processes are 
additional evidence that the EU is not the driving force behind the process. 
 
This critical observation is expressed in table 2, where we argue that cross-sectoral 
variations are greater in Spain than in Portugal. This is reflected mainly in the 
lesser degree of independence that was granted to the Spanish electricity authority 
when compared to the telecoms agency (CMT) and the greater degree of 
emphasize on competition in telecoms than in electricity in this country.  Sectoral 
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variations are more pronounced in Spain probably because of the strong position 
of private electricity providers in Spain and their strong connection with central 
and regional governments. These established electricity providers while jumping 
on the liberalization bandwagon were careful to oppose changes that were 
potentially threatening to them. In Portugal where nationalization preceded the 
restructuring of the market and of governance, the government did not have to take 
into account the interests of the private industry and thus we see a more unified 
outcome that represents the ‘national patterns ’ of policy making. In Spain 
however, these interests, together with the state, were reluctant to grant too much 
authority to a new independent regulatory body. It is this respect of the entrenched 
private ownership of the electricity market in Spain that seems to explain better 
the ease of delegation in Portugal and the difficulties in Spain, and by implication 
the bigger variations in the privatization process.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
We are now in a position to summarize our findings concerning the process of 
Europeanization and to discuss its impact according to each of the five criteria that 
were set out in the introduction to this paper. Our emphasis on the limits of 
Europeanization should not be surprising at this stage.  First, while we found a 
faster advance of liberalization after the creation of EU-level regimes for telecoms 
and electricity, we have some doubts whether this is indeed an effect of the EU 
regime. These doubts were first based on cross-regional analysis by Levi-Faur 
(2004a) but are confirmed in the context of the comparative analysis of this paper. 
Liberalization of these sectors preceded the creation of a EU regime and indeed 
went further than its requirements. This is all the more evident when one examines 
the recent change in the electricity regime (2003/54/CE), which follows rather 
than leads development at the level of the nation-states. Second, we found 
significant variations in the patterns of market integration and governance reforms. 
At the level of market integration we found that, despite considerable and, indeed 
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(from the point of view of the beginning of the 1990s), surprising progress in 
liberalization, we cannot really point to any integration of Iberian telecoms and 
electricity markets into a Europe-wide region. What we have in fact is two distinct 
national markets with varying degrees of liberalization. The limited integration of 
the Spanish and Portuguese markets does not seem to us exceptional in Europe, 
and thus it reveal the limits of Europeanization. At the level of governance 
structure, we find national variations that are independent both of the process of 
market integration and of the process of Europeanization.  
 
Third, and most important, we did not find evidence that the more limited degree 
of delegation upward to the EU in electricity (intergovernmental regime) than in 
telecoms had an impact on the national regimes in the sense that it made them less 
prone to liberalization. Liberalization at the national level in electricity moved 
swiftly beyond the requirements of the EU regime and, as has already been 
argued, before the EU followed these developments with the most recent regime 
change in the sector. Fourth, we observed that adherence to the rules of EU 
regimes, while constraining uncompetitive behaviour by governments and market 
incumbents, did not curtail it. In fact, there are still wide margins for strategic 
behaviour by politicians to pursue their ‘national interest’ policies. The two 
countries stuck to their ‘national champions’ policies; and what is most puzzling is 
the extent to which governments and national communities could adhere to EU 
rules on the one hand but continue to be engaged in mercantilist policies on the 
other. Finally, the telecoms and electricity operators’ strategies of 
internationalization seem to be directed more to Latin America and forme r 
colonies than to Europe. While arguments about the advance of the ‘single market’ 
lead us to expect that telecoms and electricity companies’ strategies of 
internationalization will correspond to the new opportunities and constraints of 
Europeanization, the evidence for this is limited, at least at present. 
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Our findings on the limits of Europeanization have two important implications. 
First, we suggest that Europeanization should not be viewed as the motor of 
liberalization and thus that we should look elsewhere for an understanding of the 
diffusion of liberalization around the world. Second, we suggest that, even under 
the EU-level regime, there is enough legal and political room for national actors to 
pursue mercantilist policies. One caveat before we conclude:  while we focus on 
the limits of Europeanization, we do not suggest that it is not important. 
Europeanization, unlike liberalization, might move too slowly to be clearly visible. 
It may well be that the formation of a single market will take longer than was 
expected. Indeed, it may still take several decades and there is no certainty about 
the result. Yet, unlike Europeanization, liberalization in a national context was a 
quite rapid policy change, which suggests again that Europeanization was not the 
central driving force behind these processes; and while it has certainly not 
prevented mercantilist policies, it has certainly established another set of policy 
constraints (and opportunities) for Spanish and Portuguese actors to take into 
account.  
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Table 2: Europeanization in a compound perspective 
Variations and similarities in Spain’s and Portugal’s liberalization processes  
 Cross-sectoral 
similarities 
Cross-sectoral  
variations  
Cross- 
national  
s imilarities  
 
 
 
 
 
Expectations : variations in the EU 
regimes and the propensity of the 
sectors for competition will have 
strong impact on the degree of 
liberalization in the two pairs of 
sectors and countries. 
 
Observations : There is clear and 
strong evidence of cross-national and 
cross-sectoral similarities in the 
movement towards more liberal 
regimes, but ones which are open 
enough to the promotion of national 
interest and national champions. 
  
 
Implications:  The observations do 
not support the expectation about a 
strong impact for Europeanization on 
the extent of liberalization.  
Expectations: Liberalization in 
electricity would develop quite slowly 
in comparison with telecoms. National 
variations will be minimal in scope in 
comparison with the sectoral one.  
 
 
Observations:  variations in the 
structure of governance and market 
opening are less distinctive than 
expected.  The variations in the degree 
of competition are mainly the result of 
technological and economic 
characteristics of the sectors 
 
 
Implications : Stronger propensity for 
competition telecoms and a supra-
national regime at the EU level did not 
prevent the two countries moving 
towards liberalization despite the 
constraints on competition in 
electricity and despite the lesser 
pressure from the EU in this respect. 
Cross- 
national 
Variations 
 
 
 
 
 
Expectations:   Portugal’s social 
étatism will result in a lesser 
propensity for liberalization than 
Spanish liberal étatism. Cross-
sectoral variations will be minimal. 
 
Observations :  The Portuguese 
moved more slowly than the Spanish 
on competition but were more 
inclined to delegate authority to the 
regulatory agencies. 
 
 
 
 
Implications : Nations and may 
better explain variations in public 
policy than variations in EU regimes. 
The arguments about the critical 
importance of Europeanization as 
major force of change are qualified. 
Expectations:  The creation of EU 
regimes will produce both sectoral and 
national variations but the degree of 
variations will differ across nations 
and sectors  
 
Observations:  Sectoral differences in 
Spain are greater than in Portugal. At 
the level of both governance and 
market, Spanish electricity differs 
from telecoms to a larger extent than 
in Portugal. Cross-national variations 
at both sectors are bigger at the level 
of governance than the market. 
 
Implications : The strength of private 
actors in Spanish electricity and their 
relative weakness in Portugal seem to 
explain better than Europeanization 
the balance of private-public power 
and the dynamics of Spanish 
liberalization. 
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Notes 
 
1 DGXIII. In 1999 it became the Information Society Directorate. 
 
2 Retevision itself was fully privatized in 1999. 
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